Dom blåbruna Alliansen och Sverigefascisterna är överlyckliga eftersom dom har attackerat regeringen hela tiden sen valet med näringslivet i spetsen och lobbygrupper. Dagens lobbying är inte som förr. Dagens lobbying handlar om aggressivt hamrande och att manipulera, allt är tillåtet idag.
Sverigefascisternas helomvändning när det gäller antisemitismen är förbluffande men med mutor (?) är dom nu värsta pro-israelerna. I själ och hjärta är det bara en fasad. Jag kan inte tänka mig annat, att man kan svänga så. Men med några goda middagar och lite annat smått och gott blev det ändring iallafall på papperet.
Under sådana omständigheter måste en regering stå på tå för att INTE hamna så snett som nu.
Anders Ygeman är den som först ska avgå. Jag har aldrig gillat honom. Han satt under 90-talet som kommunalråd i Järna när jag bodde där. Dessutom har han satt personer på pottan i en fastighetsaffär så han är ingen sjysst person enligt mig.
Anna Johansson dotter till den bullrige Göran Johansson som lärde mig kasta spjut i Kortedala för “100” år sedan. Inte lätt att leva upp till sin pappa.
Både Ygeman och Johansson är ju inga blåbär dom har varit i politiken länge och Johansson är ju född in i politiken. Hur F@N! kunde det gå såhär snett?
Avtalet pressades till att skrivas på av Regeringen!? Regeringen består av många personer. Rolf Annerberg pressade på och vem pressade på honom?
Hittar ingen GD som heter Maria Åström! Maria Ågren?
Ingen kan få mig att tro att det INTE är starka krafter bakom. INGEN!
Om Alliansen suttit kvar hade dom naturligtvis skrivit på eftersom deras mål hela tiden varit att outsourca hela Sverige till moln och olika servrar i USA! Moln/enskilda datorer där Sverige inte har någon som helst kontroll över.
Anna-Karin Hatt satt som IT-ministerm tyckte såhär!
Computer Sweden – 2011-Regeringen vill se mer outsourcing
Vi är sålda där nu Regeringen får ensamma stå med hundhuvudet då dom inte riktigt fattat vad som var i görningen och där ministrar av feghet håller käften!
Jag hoppas att detta nu blir kontraproduktivt och att folk fattar hur allt EGENTLIGEN hänger ihop och att man nu rotar i alla myndigheter och även under Alliansens tid för där tror jag att mycket smutsig byk kan grävas fram. Alliansen har aldrig haft något intresse för hur vanligt folk vill ha det.
Jag tål inte Anna Kinberg Batra! Jag tål inte hennes röst och jag tål inte på det sätt hon pratar. It is creepy!! Hennes översitteri och arrogans ger mig allergiska utslag! Jag kommer aldrig att glömma när hon i sin tidiga karriär tyckte att dom som bodde på landsbygden var dumma i huvudet. Hon tog tillbaka det MEN det är så hon tycker även idag. Det är jag övertygad om.
Jag tror att både Ygeman och Johansson får gå om Hultqvist får gå är tveksamt men Löfven kanske är tvungen att sparka honom också.
Jag hittade också något intressant på Hollands pirat-twitterkonto som jag följer och där finns en länk till Rick Falkvinges blogg. Om det stämmer får jag rysningar över hela kroppen!! Lägger ut hela inlägget här men läs gärna hela hans blogg.
Vad kan vara mer skrämmande än det här!!
Worst known governmental leak ever is slowly coming to light: Agency moved nation’s secret data to “The Cloud”
Posted on Jul 22, 2017 by Rick Falkvinge
Sweden’s Transport Agency moved all of its data to “the cloud”, apparently unaware that there is no cloud, only somebody else’s computer. In doing so, it exposed and leaked every conceivable top secret database: fighter pilots, SEAL team operators, police suspects, people under witness relocation. Names, photos, and home addresses: the list is just getting started. The responsible director has been found guilty in criminal court of the whole affair, and sentenced to the harshest sentence ever seen in Swedish government: she was docked half a month’s paycheck.
Many governments have had partial leaks in terms of method (Snowden) or relations (Manning) lately, but this is the first time I’m aware that the full treasure chest of every single top-secret governmental individual with photo, name, and home address has leaked. It goes to show, again, that governments can’t even keep their most secret data under wraps — so any governmental assurances to keep your data safe have as much value as a truckload of dead rats in a tampon factory.
It started out with a very speedy trial where a Director General in Sweden was fined half a month’s pay. Given how much the establishment has got each other’s backs, this sentence was roughly equivalent to life in prison for a common person on the street, meaning they must have done something really awful to get not just a guilty verdict, but actually be fined half a month’s salary.
On digging, it turns out the Swedish Transport Agency moved all its data to “the cloud”, as managed by IBM, two years ago. Something was found amiss when the Director General of the Transport Agency, Maria Ågren, was quickly retired from her position this January — but it was only on July 6 that it became known that she was found guilty of exposing classified information in a criminal court of law. The scandal quickly escalated from there.
There’s an enormous amount of data in Swedish about the overall leak scandal, but among all that data, one piece bears mentioning just to highlight the generally sloppy, negligent, and indeed criminal, attitude toward sensitive information:
Last March, the entire register of vehicles was sent to marketers subscribing to it. This is normal in itself, as the vehicle register is public information, and therefore subject to Freedom-of-Information excerpts. What was not normal were two things: first, that people in the witness protection program and similar programs were included in the register distributed outside the Agency, and second, when this fatal mistake was discovered, a new version without the sensitive identities was not distributed with instructions to destroy the old copy. Instead, the sensitive identities were pointed out and named in a second distribution with a request for all subscribers to remove these records themselves. This took place in open cleartext e-mail.
Take this incident and scale it up to everyday behavior at a whole agency with key responsibility for safeguarding national secrets.
At present, these databases are known to have been exposed, by moving them to “The Cloud” as if it were just a random buzzword:
The weight capacity of all roads and bridges (which is crucial for warfare, and says a lot about what roads are intended to be used as wartime airfields);
Names, photos, and home addresses of fighter pilots in the Air Force;
Names, photos, and home addresses of everybody and anybody in a police register, all of which are classified;
Names, photos, and home addresses of all operators in the military’s most secret units – equivalent to the SAS or SEAL teams;
Names, photos, and home addresses of everybody in a witness relocation program or who has been given protected identity for other reasons;
Type, model, weight, and any defects of any and all government and military vehicles, including their operator, which says a ton about the structure of military support units; the list goes on.
All of this was not just outside the proper agencies, but outside the European Union, in the hands of people who had absolutely no security clearance. All of this data can be expected to have been permanently exposed.
Let’s be clear: if a common mortal had leaked this data through this kind of negligence, the penalty would be life in prison. But not when done by the government themselves. Half a month’s pay was the harshest conceivable sentence.
The leak is still ongoing (!!) and can be expected to be fixed “maybe this fall, perhaps”. Much of the available analysis of the leak is still in the form of fully-redacted documents from the Security Police and similar agencies.
Privacy really really really remains your own responsibility.
Det andra inlägget!
Rick Falkvinge – Swedish administration leaked EU’s secure STESTA intranet to Russia, then tried glossing over it
How the Swedish administration leaked EU’s secure STESTA intranet to Russia, then tried glossing over it
Posted on Jul 21, 2017 by Rick Falkvinge
The Swedish administration is leaking its secret intranet and databases to Russia, via its Transport Agency, via the IBM cloud, via IBM’s subcontractor NCR (formerly AT&T) in Serbia, which is a close Russian military ally. Giving staff in Serbia administrative access to these networks practically guarantees that Russia also has access to the network. The European Union’s secure STESTA network is also connected to the leaked intranet. But this is not about geopolitics and who’s allied with whom, but about how an administration tries to quiet down and gloss over an apocalyptically stupid and monstrously damaging data leak.
Yesterday on this site, we told the story of the Swedish Transport Agency leaking pretty much every classified database to foreign operators, and how the responsible Director-General was docked half a month’s paycheck as punishment. It is not just a monumental boneheadedness from this agency, but also from the government in charge, who still don’t get the severity of the situation.
It was something the Swedish mainstream media kept repeating over, and over, and over again. At this time, the Swedish administration had already known for six months that a key Swedish agency was leaking Swedish and European classified networks wholesale directly to Russia, which is arguably a much worse scenario than having somebody Russian-born be employed by a Member of Parliament, and yet said nothing and did nothing. It would take another full year and a media storm to start unraveling the most damaging military and civilian leak in Sweden’s modern history.
People all over the political spectrum were basically trying to have heads roll because somebody born in Russia had been hired as a political secretary to somebody elected to Parliament according to all rules and regulations in place. The interesting thing here is not Mr. Putilov, but the contrast in establishment’s noise level to the leak scandal surfacing now.
In May 2015, IBM won a hundred-million-range-contract for managing the Swedish Transport Agency’s databases and networks, outsourced from the country. It is relevant that a) this agency manages a lot of top secret data, such as the identities and photos of undercover and operative personnel, as well as relocated witnesses, and b) this was not taken into account at all when sending the databases right out of the country. It was a very big contract in a public procurement, so anybody interested in these matters at the state actor level will have known about it and have had the ability to plant personnel with the respective subcontractors.
The interesting events start taking place in January of this year, when Maria Ågren, the Director-General of the Transport Agency was fired in maximum silence, citing “disagreements”. In reality, this event followed a 250-page mostly-redacted investigation from the Security Police. This event means that other people have been aware of the severity of the leaks for quite some time, and yet not done anything about them as they are still ongoing as of July 22, 2017. Things went to criminal trial for the charge of “criminal negligence in handling classified information”, and this is where the first really upsetting thing happens: Ågren is allowed to make a guilty plea (acceptera strafföreläggande).
This deserves some clarification.
In Sweden, a guilty plea may only be used for the very lightest of crimes – shoplifting and speeding are given as examples on the Prosecution Authority’s website – as it evades the due process of a full and public trial in a court of law.
…let’s read that again: “evades the due process of a full and public trial in a court of law”.
…does leaking most of the entire government to a foreign adversary really rank on the same level as shoplifting and speeding, and so justifies the availability of this option for a high ranking official who has just committed this monumental negligence? Of course it doesn’t.
It doesn’t take a Mensa member to realize that strings were pulled to downgrade the severity of the crime to keep it as much out of public eyes as possible, avoid a public discovery process, and so avoid embarrassment.
Basically, just hoping nobody notices the monumental ongoing leak and the resulting danger to the country and its staff.
This is the first of the obvious steps to silence the matter. There’s more: by this guilty plea, an appeal (by either prosecutor or defense) has been prevented, and so things will never go to public court and discovery. Further, since there is no appeal, the penalty has been set in stone – Ågren loses half a month’s pay in fines for leaking pretty much the entire military and civilian database set. It was this punishment that was the clue for many: the fact that somebody was found guilty at all in an establishment where everybody covers everybody else’s back must mean that something truly awful has taken place.
The second thing that upsets a lot of people is the fact that everybody was aware they were breaking the law by being negligent with classified information, but just didn’t care. They even had formal meeting notes where the decision was taken to “make deviations from the law [about proper procedures for classified data]”. Normally, we would not call this “meeting notes about the decision to make deviations from law” but rather something more like a “written and signed confession of a committed crime”.
The third step is the complete and utter silence from people in charge, and whom we now know knew about this for a considerable time. By now, mainstream media has published documents that show that the Interior Minister and the Infrastructure Minister were completely aware of the ongoing leaks as early as 18 months ago, and they said and did nothing. Further, most of the media focus has been on the leaks of, and damage to, Swedish secrets. But this affair goes way beyond Sweden and its administration.
Part of what IBM contracted to was run, and which was run from Serbia, was the Swedish government’s secure intranet – the SGSI, the Secure Government Swedish Intranet. This network is in turn connected to the European Union’s STESTA, which is a European Union secure network.
This is what the Swedish Transport Agency gave staff in Serbia administrative network access to, and it is no conspiracy theory that Serbia is a close military ally with Russia. While it can’t be proven in this specific case that high-value military information in Serbia’s hands also comes into Russia’s hands, it’s one of those things that should just be assumed in the general case.
The net effect here is that the EU secure Intranet has been leaked to Russia by means of deliberate lawbreaking from high ranking Swedish government officials. Even if there are additional levels of encryption on STESTA, which there may or may not be, this has “should never happen” written all over it.
At some point you have to ask yourself how long it’s okay to just keep silent and, as detailed above, pull strings to keep things silent and just hope nobody notices how insanely badly high-ranking officials really screwed up and how much data is still leaking. At what point is glossing over something like this ever acceptable?
And the contrast between the government’s silence on this, vis-a-vis the government’s utter panic about Egor Putilov, is stunningly embarrassing.
Privacy remains your own responsibility.